Ab stract : This orticle describes the importont str uctu rol chorocteristics of o recently developed gome-theoretic model of deterrence 1 summorize s the mojor deductions drown from it 1 ond discu sses it s implicotions for both t he theory of deterrence ond the cu r rent strotegic relationship of the superpowers. The model shows thot o credible threot ond o power odvon toge ore neither necessory nor sufficient conditions for stoble deter r ence. It also suggests t hot 1 even unde r ideal conditions 1 deterrence is an intricote ond fundomentolly fragile relation ship thot rests 1 ultlmotely 1 upon the prefe ren ces ond perceptions of key decislon-mokers rother thon upon the nature ond composition of eoch side's st rot egic orsenol.
lntroduction
No slngle concept hos dominoted tfle stroteg ic field over the post forty yeor s os hos the concept of deterre nce. Yet 1 curiou sly 1 the theory of deterrence r emeins woefully underspecified. Although severol dossie st udles in eoch of the three 'woves' of the deter r ence Iiterature identified by Je r vis ( 1979) con be pointed to, no single outhoritotive sou rce, no seminol work, cu r rently exists. 1 Mor eover, the field is literolly strewn wlth o moss of dlsconnec ted ond seemingly controdictory hypotheses, oll purportedly deduced from o common set of ossumptions (for o par tial lis ting, see Smith 1982) . To oppreclote the disorroy of this field of study one need onl y reflect on the not u re of the debote in t he United Stetes in the lote 1960s ond the eorly 1970s over the development of an on tibollistic mlssile s ystem, or the current controversies sur r ounding the deployment of the MX missile ond the Strategie Defense Initia tive, or Star Wors, program of the Reogon Administration.
The huge gulf thot separates p r oponents ond opponents on these ond re loted issues reflects the shoky foundation upon which t he theoretical e dlflce of deterrence theory rests. lnexplicably, the underpinnings of deterrence theory hove been more or less lgnored since the eorly 1960s with the demise of Americon nucleor superiority ond the 'second wave' of t heor izlng ossocioted wi t h lt. lndeed, o coreful inspection of this foundation reveols severol fou lts ond cracks in the underlying orchitecture (Zagare 1987) . l f deterrence were a building, it would probably be condemned.
Ta lay a sounder foundation for the theory of deterrence, I have elsewhere constructed a new model of deterrence and applied it to both the 1967 and 1973 crises in the Middle East, as weil as to t he full sweep of the strotegic relationship of the United Stetes and the Soviet Union ( Zagare 1987) . In my opinion, this model and the theory of moves framewerk that I use to analyze it (Broms 1983; Zagare 1984 ; Kilg our/Zogore 1986) has proven to be an extr emely potent device for onalyzing deterrence and for generating insights into its dynamics. My purpese in this poper is to offer o description of the importont structurol chorocteristics of this model in terms of the current relationship of the superpower s, to summorize t he mojor deductions drown from it, ond to discuss its wider implications for the theory of deterrence.
A Brief Resurne of a Deterrence Model
Ta t his end consider for now the generolized representotion of the superpower deterrence gome depicted in Figure I . In this game, eoch of the superpower s is ossumed to hove two strotegies, one that suppor t s the status qua (o 1 or b 1 ) ond one thot does not (a 2 or b 2 ) . These two strategies, in turn, give r ise to 2 x 2 " 4 possible outcome s, summarized verbolly in Figure I . These outcomes ore represented by an or dered pair in each cell of the outcome motrix. By convention, the firs t entry of eoch pair represen t s the poyoff to the row ployer (here, the United Stetes), ond the second entry the payoff to the column ployer (her e, the Soviet Union), should t hot outcome be selected by the players.
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FIGURE 1: GENERALIZED REPRESENTATION OF TIIE SUPERPOWER DETERRENCE GAME For instonce, if both ployers select their first strotegy, the outcome ossocioted with the stotu s quo, (o 1 ,b 1 ), results . In this cose, the poyoff to the United Stotes is o 1 while the poyoff t o the Soviet Union is b 1 .
Implicit in o det er rence gome such os the one dep icted in Figure 1 ore severoi oss umptions obout the utility functions, (u), of the t wo ployers. For exomple, it seems sofe to ossume thot in ony deterrence gome eoch ployer would like to prevent the other ployer from toking some unspecified oction t hot would up set the st otus quo, t hot is:
For the US: for the US SR:
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Moreover, while the requi remen ts expressed in equotion ( 1) ore necessory fo r o gome to quolify os o deterrence gome , they cleorly ore not sufficient. For the notion of de terrence to be of some solience, ot least one ployer must hove on incentive to move owoy from the stotus quo. Games whe rein this minimal condition is sotisfied will be ter med unilateral deterrence gomes. When both ployers hove an incentive to upset t he stotus quo, o gome of mutual deterrence will be soid to exist. 2
Unilateral de te r rence gomes, then, by definition, meet the restrictions of equotion ( 1) ond ore chorocterized by two ployers with osymmetric motivotions: o stotus guo ployer who prefers the stotus quo to oll other out comes ond o revision1st ployer who prefers, uniloterolly , to chon ge it. He nce, in o unilateral deterre nce gome wh e r e, soy the United Stotes, is postuloted to be the stotus quo ployer ond where, soy the Soviet Union, is postuloted to be the revision1st ployer, the followi ng res t rictions will chorocterize the preference orders of the two ployers:
For t he US: for the USSR:
By controst, in o gome of mutual deter r ence, the preferences of t he two ployers with r es pect to these some outcomes ore completely s ymmetric: eoch ployer prefers, uniloterolly, to upset the stotus quo ond prefers thot the other ployer not upset it. In mutual de terrence gomes, then, the following r estriction s on the preference orders of the two ployers will hold:
For the US: for the USSR:
From the obove it is easy to see thot once o deterrence gome hos been identified os eit her unilateral or mutual, eoch ployer' s p refe rence for th ree of the four outcomes ore occounted for. 3 But to complete the order ing ond, hence, to fully determine the nature of the deterrence gome, it is necessory to specify the preference relationship of t hese t hree ou t comes to (o 2 , b 2 ). (o 2 , b 2 ) represents the outcome thot would be induced if one player upset the status qua in order to gain a unilateral advantage and the other player resisted and attempted to punish the first and deny his opponent these advantages. Put differently 1 ( a 21 b 2 ) represents the threat upon which the deterrence relationship rests.
Patently 1 each player's evaluation of this threat outcome is a function of the capability af the other; and each player 's perception of the other's evaluation of this outcome depends upon the credibility of the other player's th reat. T h u s 1 if capability is defined as the ability to hurt ( Schelling 1966) 1 each player will have a capable th reat if and onl y if the other player prefers that 1 if he takes the prohibited action 1 the threat not be carried out. lt follows 1 therefore 1 that if both players have a capable threat: (4a) (4b)
By cantrast 1 if one player has a capable t h r eat and the other does not 1 the preference ranking of the opponent of the player whose threat is capable would simply reverse the restric tion of eq uation (4). And if neither player is capable of hurting the other 1 the preferences of both players would be reversed.
Finally 1 credibility. By most occounts 1 c r edibility is the 'magic ingredient' of every deterrence relationship (Freedmon 1981 1 96). Credibility means that the player being deterred must believe that the threat will be carried out if he takes the prohibited action. The essence of credibility 1 then 1 resides in a subjective evaluation on the part of the player being deterred of the willingness 1 or preference 1 of the other player to execute his threat. Unless the player being deterred perceives that the other prefers ·to resist 1 rother than accept 1 a unilateral departure from the status quo 1 a threat will not be seen to be credible (Fraser/Hipel 1979 1 802).
Note that such an evaluation may not necessorily correspond with objective reality. A th reat that is believed will be credible 1 whether or not the player making it intends to carry it out. Similarly 1 whatever the intentions of the threatener are1 its threat will not be credible unless it is believed by the other player. Hence1 if bot h players in a deterrence game have a credible th r eat 1 the following restriction will apply:
the USSR perceives that for the US: u(a 21 b 2 ) > u(a 11 b 2 ) 1 and the US perceives that for the USSR: u(a 21 b 2 ) > u(a 21 b 1 ).
(5o) (5b)
As before 1 the Iack of a credible threat by one or both players can be reflected by appropriate modifications of the direction of the inequalities in these equations.
Depending upon whether the deterrence relationship is unilateral or mutual, and whether each player's threat is capable 4 or credible, a number of structurolly distinct deterrence games con be, identified. In wha t follows, a theory of moves anolysis will be used to indicate the conditions under which deterrence con be expected to succeed or foil (i.e., is stoble) in each of them.
A. Mutual Deterrence. In Figure 2 , the three core games of mutual deterrence ore listed. In this representation, the (ordinal) poyoffs of the two ployers ore ronked from "1" to "4", with "4" representing each player's best outcome, "3" eoch ployer's next-best outcome, and so on. Thus, when this convention is adopted, the outcome (4, 1) represents the best outcome for the United $totes ond the worst outcome for the Soviet Union.
Note thot each game sotisfies the restrictions of equotions (3a) ond (3b), that is, each ployer is assumed to prefer, unilaterolly, to upset the stotus quo and to prefer thot the other not upset it. The three games ore distinguished from one onother only by different ossumptions about the credibility of each ployer's threot.
In game 1 (Prisoners' Dilemma), both players ore postuloted to hove a credible threot, thot is, both prefer to resist rother than occept o unilateral deviotion from the stotus quo by the other. In gome 2 ( Chicken), neither player hos a credible threot . And in game 3 (Called Bluff), one ployer (in this case the United $totes) is assumed to have a credible threot while the other (i.e., the Soviet Union) is not.
In two of these three games (1 and 2), deterrence con be stoble, olthough the conditions that must be satisfied for stobility to persist ore somewhot different in eoch cose. In the Prisoners' Dilemma gome ( 1), wherein both ployers hove o credible threot, deterrence is stoble os long os eoch ployer hos a second-strike copobility, thot is, the obility to move to the outcome ossociated with mutual punishment (i.e.,(a 2 ,b 2 )) should the other player deport f r om the status quo. {For o demonstrotion, see Zagare 1985b). The reoson for this is thot, in this gome, it is precisely eoch ployer's threot to induce this outcome that removes the incentive of the other player to seek o unilateral odvantoge by upsetting the status quo.
Interestingly, deterrence moy also be stable if both players Iack a credible threat. The conditions upon which deterrence stobility rests in Chicken, however, are more stringent than in Prisoners' Dilemma. In Chicken, stable deterrence depends upon the obility of both players to move through mutual punishment, as in a limited war. Finally, in Called Bluff (game 3), wherein only one player has a credible threat, deterrence is not stable. Under these canditian s , the player who is willing, and able, to punish a departure from the s totus quo by the other wins. These conclusions , moreove r, ore relotively unoffected by power osymmetries (os distinct from copabilities). 5 Only when neither player hos a credible threot does o power imbalance e nte r into the deterrence e quotion. Under these conditions, deterrence is not stoble since the more powerful ployer connot be deterred f r om upsetting t he s totus quo ond inducing its best outcome os the final outcome of the game.
USSR
B. Unilateral Deter rence. Paradoxieoll y, deter rence is much more difficult to ochieve in the four core gomes of unilateral de te r rence listed in Figure  3 thon in the t hree gomes of mutual deterrence discussed obove, 6 since s t ronger assumptions are necessory to induce o s toble outcome in the unilateral deterrence games. Mo re specifically, for one outcome to be rende red stoble in each of the games of Figure 3 ( signiflcantly, it is the status quo), the revision1st player must prefer the certain selection of his nextbest oytcome to the lottery thot cantoins his best and two warst outcomes.
As explained in greater detail in Zagare ( 1985o), such an ossumption is more likely to be sot isfied when the revision1s t player is risk -averse, that is, when he deflates the (cordinal) value of his best and two warst outcomes relative to t he value of his next-best outcome. Thu s, the success of unila teral deterrence depends less on the credibility of each player's t hreot than on the ottitude of the revision1st ployer toword risk. As long os the revision1st ployer is risk-averse, the stotus quo is stoble in unilateral deterrence games. Otherwise, the games a re indeterminate.
Power asymmetries, however , may upset this conclusion. In a unilateral deterrence game with an unequal distribu t ion of power, a stotus quo power con ensure it s best au t come and, in the process, stabilize the deterrence r elotionship, if it has a credible t hreot or t he revision1s t ployer Iacks one. Still, preponderance clone is not sufficient for t he success of deterrence in its unilateral variant . lf o more powerful status q uo player Iacks credibility and the revision1st player does not, deterrence is not stoble. Similarly, deterrence is also unstoble when a weaker stotus quo player's threat is not credible.
General Canclusions and lmplications
Tabfes I a nd II summor ize the conclusians drawn from a theory of moves onalysis of the strategic relationship of the United States and t he Soviet Union. Each table controls for two different power canfig u r a tions and the fou r, logically possible, assumptions that can be made about the credibility of eoch ployer's t h reat. T able I posit s a game of mutual deter rence while Table II Two importont quolificotions about these deductions ore in order. First, oll of these conclusions rest upon the ossumption that each ployer has, ot minimum, a second-strike copobility, thot is, the ability to respond should the other ployer move from the stotus quo. (In one cose more stringent ossumptions ore required to generote the listed finding; this exception is indicated in a toble note.) And second, under certoin conditions, olmost oll of t hese results can be disturbed.
8 Since both tobles would be unduly complicated if every possible exception were noted, I hove listed only those conclusions thot ore both theoretically ond empiricolly relevant to the stroteglc relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union.
Tobles I ond II con be use to draw several lnteresting concluslons about both the nature of deterrence interoctions in generol and t.he dynomics of the strategic relationship of the superpowers in porticular. First, note that credibility is not quite the mogle ingredient that it is claimed to be, although it remoins o very importont part of the deterrence relationship nonetheless. Credibility is neither o necessory nor a sufficient condition for successful deterrence. For instance, in a game of unilateral deterrence where both players have a credible threot, deterrence moy foil if the revision1st ployer is not risk -overse . Moreover, os demonstroted in Zagare (1987), without a capoble threat, a ployer whose threot is credible will also be unable to deter an opponent who prefers to upset the stotus quo. By cantrast, under some conditions, deterrence moy constitute a stoble relationship, even when eoch player's threat Iacks inherent credibility. To wit, provided thot the outcome associated with mutual punishment does not imply termination of t he gome, and provided thot neither ployer possesses deor-eut conventionol superiority, mutual deterrence remoins s table even when both ployers have incredlble threots. Deterrence ls also stoble under these conditions in unilateral deterrence Situations if t he bolance of power fovors the stotu s quo player.
Llke credibility, o power odvantoge is neither necessory nor sufficien t for deterrence to work. A weoker ployer with a capoble and credible threot, for instance, should be oble to deter a stronger opponent. Conversely, o dominant power moy, under certoin conditions, be unoble to deter its weoker odversory. Thus, at the theoretical Ievel at least, deterrence stabilit9 is not a direct consequence of either o balonce or an imbolonce of power.
All of which suggests thot deterrence interoctions ore intricote and unusually complex. There is no one-to-one relationship between ony s ingle dimension of the model and averoll deterrence stobility. Slight olterotions in one or another parometer, such os the nature of each ployer's retaliotory threat, power, offensive abllity, weopons characteristics, ond ottitude toword risk moy hove dromotic consequences for the success, or the failure, of deterrence. (See Zagare 1987, far additional details. )
Frank C. Zogare
Another interesting insight thot emerges from the theoretical development of the model stems from the structurol implicotions ossociated with game theory's notorious Prisoners' Dilerrmo gome. lf this gome in fact represents the mutual deterrence relationship in its ideal monifestation -that is, when both ployers hove a capoble and credible retoliatory threat -then it follows t hot p layers in deterrence ond related crisis gomes will hove an incentive to try to create or reinfarce interactions that shore its structure. This inference is supported in several empirical opplications of the model. For instance, in both the 1967 and the 1973 crises in the Middle East, decision -mokers in the Soviet Union ond the United States exhibited a tendency to transmit tit-for -tot communicotions to one another, conveying both a willingness to compromise, but also o determination to respond to the untoward behovior of the other. Thus, not anly does the structure of this game describe the conditions conducive to stoble mutual deterrence, but it also exploins the obvious and well-documented discrepancies between the behavior exhibited by stetes during actual crisis situat ions and some of the more esoteric crisis monagement strategies suggested by some deterrence theorists ( Young 1968; Snyder/Diesing 1977 ) .
The stability characteristics of the status quo in Prisoners' Dilenrna are also suggesti ve of another solient choracteristic of these relationships. Deterrence constitutes a stoble relationship in this gome only when the compromise outcome is the status quo ond both players have the ability to punish deportures from it. In the absence af these conditions, deterrence is unstobte and conflict is implied. Thus, even in its ideal form, deterrence is rickety ond fragile.
T he delicate balance of ter ror is u nder scored b y o historical analy sis of the strotegic relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union. Fortunately, this relationship has remoined s toble despite the foct that it has undergone consideroble evolution since its inception in 1945. Same may Interpret the continuing stability of the superpower relationship as evidence of the rob us tness of dete rrence. But since some rother disturbing assumptions ore required to exploin the observed stability of certain periods of the post-war era, there is more here than mee ts the eye. For instance, if one orgues that only the United States was interested in upset ting the status quo from 1946 to 1948, os does Howard (1983), or if one orgues that only the Soviets were revision1st during this period, os do Intriligator and Brito (1984, 82) or Brodie (1959) , then Soviet riskavers ion -in the first cose -or American risk-oversion -in the second cose -must be assumed to explain the absence of a superpower war ot this time. Similarly, one can not exploin stobility from 1962 to 1966 when the United Stotes possessed a first -strike copability (Quester 1970, 216; Friedberg 1982, 69) without also ossuming that the United States was a status quo power. Finally, one cannot explain the absence of o superpower war since 1967 wlthout also assuming that at leas t one superpower was oble to moke credible o threot to retoliote ot o time when retoliotion implied the destruction of its politicol, economic ond sociol system. The problemotic nature of this ossumption is underscored in Achen's ( 1986) lotest contribution to the literoture.
lt oppeors, then, thot deterrence is not directly o function of those variables thot ore most eosily monipuloted by decision-mokers, t hot is, the nature ond composition of eoch side's strotegic orsenol. Rother deterrence stobility resides 'in the heods' of world Ieaders. lt depends not only on obvious objective foctors, but moy also hinge on the preferences ond per-. ceptions (or misperceptions) of those who hove the obility to induce Armogeddon. Such foctors, unlike the bolonce of militory power, con be subject to quick ond errotic chonges, os coup d'etots, revolutions, elections, illness, ond other forces bring obout fundamental leadership chonges. Deter rence is indeed o ten uou s relotion s hip.
Frank C. Zagare • 5 By power I mean "the ability to prevail in conflict" (Deutsch 1978, 23) .
Although several distinct notions of power have been developed within the theory of maves fromework, I have used the concept of holding power (Kilgour/Zogare 1986) to measure the impact of an asymmetric distribution of power in a deterrence game. Holding power is simply the ability of one player in a sequential game to stoy at an outcome Ionger than his opponent.
